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Domestic US sugar production has been protected by
government policy for the past 82 years, resulting in el-
evated domestic prices and an estimated annual (2013)
$1.4 billion dollar ‘‘tax’’ on consumers. These elevated
prices and the simultaneous federal support for domestic
corn production have ensured a strong market for high-
fructose corn syrup. Americans have dramatically increased
their consumption of caloric sweeteners during the same
period. Consumption of ‘‘empty’’ calories (ie, foods with
low-nutrient/high-caloric density)Vsugar and high-fructose
corn syrup being the primary sourcesVis considered by
most public health experts to be a key contributing factor
to the rise in obesity. There have been substantial efforts
to tax sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) to both reduce
consumption and provide a source of funds for nutrition
education, thereby emulating the tobacco tax model.
Volume-based SSB taxes levy the tax rate per ounce of
liquid, where some are only imposed on beverages with
added sugar content exceeding a set threshold. Nonethe-
less, volume-based taxes have significant limitations in
encouraging consumers to reduce their caloric intake due
to a lack of transparency at the point of purchase. Thus, it
is hypothesized that point-of-purchase, nutrient-specific
excise taxes on SSBs would be more effective at reducing
sugar consumption. However, all SSB taxes are limited by
the possibility that consumers may compensate their de-
creased intake from SSBs with other high-calorie junk foods.
Furthermore, there are noexisting studies toprovide evidence
on howSSB taxeswill impact obesity rates in the long term.
The paradox of sugar prices is that Americans have paid
higher prices for sugar to protect domestic production for
more than 80 years, and now, Americans are being asked
to pay even more to promote public health. The effective
use of sugar taxes should be considered based on their
merits in reducing sugar consumption and making avail-
able anewsourceof funds to support nutrition education,
not on lobbying efforts by the food industry or sugar and
corn producers. Nutr Today. 2017;52(3):143Y150
HISTORY OF SUGAR PRICE SUPPORTS
Americans consumed 12 million tons of refined sugar in
2013, with each pound costing 6 cents more than the in-
ternational average price. Thus, Americans paid $1.4 billion
extra for sugar in 2013.1 Despite this tariff, which has been
in place for many years, the average consumption of added
sugars by American adults has increased by 30% since
1977.2 How does this dichotomy of inflated domestic sugar
prices and ever increasing sugar consumption make sense?
Sugar price control started with the Sugar Act of 1934 dur-
ing the Great Depression.3 Quotas on domestic sugar pro-
duction, foreign imports, and advertisements were issued
under the act, as well as a one-half cent per pound subsidy
for beet and sugarcane sugarVthe primary sugar crops
in the United States.3 The Sugar Act, which was meant to
stimulate the American economy, expired 40 years later
in 1974.3 Then in 1976, President Ford tripled the im-
port tariff on sugar.3 The International Trade Commis-
sion advised President Carter in 1977 to establish a quota
for sugar imports in light of their threat to the domes-
tic sugar industry.3 Rather than establishing an import
quota, President Carter championed a payment program
for sugar farmers, offering ‘‘supplemental payments of up
to two cents a pound whenever the market price [fell]
below 13.5 cents per pound.’’4 The Agriculture and Food
Act of 1981 further increased sugar price support levels.3
President Reagan reintroduced country-by-country import
Food and Nutrition Policy
Volume 52, Number 3, May/June 2017 Nutrition Today\ 143
Abby Dilk, BS, earned a BS in Nutrition Science, with minors in biology
and chemistry, from PurdueUniversity in 2016. Dilk is currently earning her
Master’s in Public Health Nutrition at the George Washington University.
Dennis A. Savaiano, PhD, is the Virginia Meredith Professor of Nutri-
tion Policy at Purdue University. Dr Savaiano has degrees fromClaremont
McKenna College (BA in Biology) and the University of California at Davis
(MS and PhD in Nutrition). He was a professor in the Department of Food
Science and Nutrition at the University of Minnesota from 1980 through
1995 and Dean of Consumer and Family Sciences at Purdue University
from 1995 to 2010.
Purdue University provided funding to allow this article to publish as
open access.
Dr Savaiano is chair of the Ritter PharmaMedical advisory board, and is a
member of the Dannon Nutrition Advisory Board. Ms Dilk has no con-
flicts of interest to disclose.
Correspondence: Dennis A. Savaiano, PhD, Department of Nutrition Sci-
ence, Purdue University, 700 West State St, West Lafayette, IN 47906
(savaiano@purdue.edu).
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CCBY-
NC-ND), where it is permissible to download and share the work provided
it is properly cited. The work cannot be changed in any way or used
commercially without permission from the journal.
Copyright * 2017 The Authors. Published by Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc.
DOI: 10.1097/NT.0000000000000217
Copyright © 2017 The Authors. Published by Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc.
quotas in an attempt to keep market prices high.3 Later
in his presidency in 1985, Reagan signed the Food
Security Act but pushed to reduce the sugar price support
program, which he viewed as a ‘‘counterproductive’’
program that ‘‘poses significant problems in the areas of
trade policy, foreign policy, and agricultural policy.’’3,5
The Food, Agriculture and Trade Act of 1990, as endorsed
by President George H.W. Bush, supported the sugar
industry by establishing marketing allotments and mar-
keting assessmentsVthe former ofwhich limits how much
of certain commodities can be sold and the latter being
monetary contributions collected from sugar producers
and first purchasers that reduce the budget deficit target.3
President Clinton fixed refined beet and raw cane sugar
loan rates at 22.9 and 0.18 cents, respectively, when he
signed the Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act in
1996.3 In addition, limits on sugar marketing were repealed,
and an increase of 0.25 cent/lb was instituted for market-
ing assessments.3 Then in 2008, President George W. Bush
vetoed The Farm Bill, which supported the existing sugar
program but simultaneously increased sugar loan rates
and limited the Secretary of Agriculture’s ability to increase
the refined sugar import quota.6 President Bush’s veto was
overridden by the House and the Senate, thereby con-
tinuing the existing sugar regulation for 4 more years.3 In
2012, Congress further extended the sugar program until
September 30, 2013.3 Most recently, the Agricultural Act of
2014 left the sugar program unchanged.3 Thus, for the past
80 years, federal laws have protected sugar farmers by
limiting sugar imports, leading to higher sugar prices for
US consumers. Corn syrup is not taxed, but corn has been
strongly supported in farm bills. For the past decades, it
has a less expensive source of sugar than cane.
SUBSTITUTION OF SUGAR WITH
HIGH-FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP
Food companies have successfully avoided high sugar
prices by using sugar’s less expensive substitute, high-
fructose corn syrup (HFCS). For comparison, the average
wholesale prices of beet sugar and HFCS during the 2000s
were 27.33 and 21.72 cents/lb, respectively.7,8 The price
of US beet sugar soared from 2009 to 2012 as a result of
low sugar production around the world when adverse
weather negatively impacted many sugar farms.9 High-
fructose corn syrup prices steadily increased during the
2000s because of drought-induced US corn production
declines.10 Thus, inclement weather has resulted in a
marginal cost difference between HFCS and beet sugar.
However, beet sugar was still 2.79 and 0.10 cents higher
than HFCS-42 and HFCS-55, respectively, in 2015.7Y10 High-
fructose corn syrup is a liquid sweetenermadeby extracting
corn syrup from corn starch using chemical and enzymatic
cleavage.11 >-Amylase and glucoamylase hydrolyze corn
starch to corn syrup containing mainly glucose, and glu-
cose isomerase converts some of the glucose to fructose.
This process modifies corn syrup’s composition to have a
slightly higher percentage of fructose than glucose. Corn
has historically been a heavily subsidized crop grown in
large midwestern monocrop fields.10 Subsidized produc-
tion and advanced technology are responsible for the ef-
ficiency and low cost of HFCS, which can be found in
virtually all processed foods such as ketchup, breads, salad
dressings, yogurts, fast food, ice cream, and soda.10 The
Global Development and Environment Institute and Tufts
University report that ‘‘the annual per-capita consumption
of caloric sweeteners has increased by 40 pounds in the last
40 years, and high-fructose corn syrup accounts for 81% of
the 83 additional calories the average American consumes
each day from sweeteners alone.’’12 Thus, it would seem
that the increased use of HFCS is due both to sugar import
quotas (resulting in higher sugar prices) and historical
corn subsidies. Furthermore, corn subsidies also aid the
livestock industry, which purchases much of America’s
corn harvest as feed for its chickens, pigs, and cows.12 It
is reported that purchasing livestock that were fed pri-
marily subsidized grain (ie, corn) saved chicken processors
$11.3 billion, pork processors $8.5 billion, and dairy
processors $6.6 billion between 1997 and 2005.12 Hence,
the sugar program involves and benefits more than only
sugar farmers (Figure).
SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE TAXES
AND PUBLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES
Public health efforts to decrease consumption of sugar-
sweetened beverages (SSBs), which include regular soft
drinks, energy and sports drinks, fruit drinks that are not
100% fruit juice, and sweetened teas and coffees, include
taxation, emulating tobacco taxation. High cigarette and
tobacco product taxes seemed to be very successful in
reducing smoking rates.13 Furthermore, funds generated
from tobacco taxes have often been directed toward
public health initiatives that promote tobacco education
and tobacco control programs, presumably leading to
further reductions in tobacco use.13 Sugar taxation intends
to generate a similar effect, with the goals of decreasing
caloric intake of nutrient poor foods. Currently, 35 states
and the District of Columbia have sales taxes on sodas sold
in grocery stores, and 40 states and the District of Columbia
have sales taxes on sodas sold in vending machines (see
Table 1).14,15 However, such small taxes seem to be inef-
fective at reducing the consumption of regular soda.
Price elasticity is a measure of the responsiveness of the
demand for a product when its price is changed and can
help us better understand how effective soda taxes are
on decreasing consumption. On the basis of a systematic
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literature review, soft drinks reportedly have a price
elasticity range of 0.13 to 3.18 and a mean price elasticity
of 79%.16 Thus, ‘‘assuming no substitution of soft drinks
with other caloric beverages and no change in other
factors affecting purchasing behavior,’’ researchers’ esti-
mates of the price elasticity of soft drinks ‘‘suggest that a
10% tax on soft drinks could lead to an 8% to 10% reduc-
tion in purchases of these beverages.’’16 Thus, it is pro-
posed that an excise tax of 1 cent/oz on SSBs would
prompt a minimum reduction of 10% of calorie consump-
tion from sugary drinks, which amounts to 20 kcal per
person per day.17 A reduction of that level seems to be
sufficient to produce weight loss and reduction in the risk
of obesity and diabetes.17 However, this assumes no caloric
compensation from other foods, which is theoretically
unlikely. A smaller increase in price would probably not
affect purchasing decisions, especially among the poor
who might have a lower elasticity for purchase17 (Table 2).
A product-specific excise tax is preferred (vs a sales tax)
by many economists because it is based on a characteristic
(ie, volume, calories, or nutrients) of the product rather
than price.17 Furthermore, with a sales tax, consumers
would likely become aware of the tax only after deciding
to purchase the drink, and refills of fountain drinks would
go untaxed.17 An excise tax, however, would be imposed
on producers and wholesalers, who would then pass on
the cost to retailers and consumers. Thus, consumers are
aware of the total cost of SSBs, sugar taxes included, at the
time of purchase.17 This approach is currently implemented
in Berkeley, California.18 It is estimated that 47% of the tax
of 1 cent/oz has been successfully passed through to the
retail price for SSBs in Berkeley.19 Furthermore, SSB con-
sumption has decreased by 21% in Berkeley in the year
since the tax’s enactment, whereas SSB consumption in
comparison cities without SSB taxes, such as Oakland and
San Francisco, increased by 4%.20
An alternativemethod of taxation is to tax SSBs by calories.
A tax of 0.04 cent per calorie on sugar drinks would re-
portedly decrease an individual’s caloric intake by 5800
calories per year, assuming no caloric compensation.21
Thus, an excise tax of 0.04 cent per calorie has the power
to reduce the consumption of beverage calories by 9.3%,
whereas a tax of 0.5 cent/oz would result in a lesser 8.6%
reduction.22 Researchers note that ‘‘this is attributed to the
fact that a tax on caloric content can achieve a reduction in
calories consumed from sugar-sweetened beverages at
less of a cost to the consumer than a volume-based tax.’’22
In fact, a 0.04-cent, calorie-based tax would save con-
sumers an estimated $736 million per year in comparison
with a tax of 1 cent/oz.22 A nutrient-specific tax has also
been proposed to tax SSBs. By applying a 20% tax that is
directly proportional to the percentage of sugar in the
formula of ingredients, sugar consumption and overall
caloric intake can purportedly be decreased by 16.41%
and 18.54%, respectively.23 Thus, of the possible ap-
proaches to taxing SSBs, a nutrient-based tax for sugar-
containing drinks may prove to be most effective at
decreasing SSB consumption due to its ability to reduce
caloric intake to a greater degree than both product- and
calorie-based taxes.
LIMITATIONS OF SSB TAXES
Although SSBs show promise in reducing obesity rates,
evidence supporting this claim has significant limitations.
In regard to volume-, calorie-, and nutrient-specific taxes,
the increased likelihood of consumers substituting SSBs
with beverages containing artificial sweeteners is a sig-
nificant possible outcome for each taxation method be-
cause consumers may still seek out sweet beverages.22
Furthermore, there is some concern that a tax-induced
decrease in calories from SSBs could result in consumers
compensating with calorically similar, untaxed foods and
other beverages such as orange juice or chocolate milk.24
A study examining substitution in regard to a 20% sales
tax on SSBs found a statistically significant substitution
FIGURE. Wholesale price trends of beet sugar, HFCS-55, and HFCS-42 since the year 2000.7,8
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of SSBs with fruit juices (+2.5 kcal/d) and canned soups (+
1.9 kcal/d).25 On the other hand, taxation of SSBs did not
affect cookie and candy consumption, and it even caused
a decrease in salty snack (j6.3 kcal/d) and ice cream
(j4.8 kcal/d) consumption.25 These observations may be
more or less prominent in the proposed taxes of 1 cent/
oz, 0.04 cent per calorie, and 20% nutrient specific.25
As evidenced by Denmark’s failed ‘‘fat tax’’ on foods
containing more than 2.3% of saturated fat, pairing junk
food taxes with subsidies on healthy foods such as fruits
and vegetables may prevent consumers from substituting 1
unhealthy habit (eg, high-fat food consumption) for an-
other (eg, soda consumption).26
Because SSB taxes are a relatively recent phenomenon,
research on the effectiveness of SSB taxes in reducing the
incidence of overweight and obesity is limited tomodeling
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studies. For example, a tax of 25 cents/L (ie, volume-based
excise tax) has been estimated to reduce obesity rates by
1.3% in the United Kingdom.27 Furthermore, there are in-
adequate data available onwhether SSB taxes are capable of
sustaining decreases in SSB purchases and consumption
long term. During the first year of Mexico’s volume-based
excise tax of 1 peso/L on nondairy and nonalcoholic bev-
erages with added sugar, SSB purchases decreased by 6%,
whereas purchases of untaxed beverages (especially bot-
tled water) increased by 3.9%.28 Still, the full extent of
purchasing substitutions is not yet known. Thus, long-term
monitoring to understand purchasing changes and poten-
tial indicators on health is needed. We conclude that public
health officials advocating for SSB taxes need additional
evidence to support claims that SSB taxes can ultimately
decrease the magnitude of the ongoing obesity epidemic.
There has been significant controversy related to the long-
term effect of Mexico’s SSB tax on soda sales. In May 2016,
The Wall Street Journal reported a collective 16.5% in-
crease in soda sales since 2015 for Coca-Cola’s 2 major
Mexican bottling companies.29 The soda industry used these
data as evidence to their claim that SSB taxes are fruitless
but did not correct for these sales statistics that were based
on total aggregate sales. That is, they did not account for
population rise, inflation, unemployment rates, or other
socioeconomic factors affecting consumption.30 Indepen-
dent results that did correct for concurrent factors sug-
gested decreases in SSB consumption. However, it is
difficult to effectively assess the tax’s sustainability and
durability at such an early stage in its implementation.
It is also unclear as to how a tax on SSBs might impact the
overall health of children. One economic modeling study
suggested that a tax of penny per ounce on SSBs would
result in a 2.4% decrease in childhood obesityVa greater
effect than after-school physical activity programs and
banning fast food advertising targeted at children.31 How-
ever, researchers also reported that, although a 20%
SSB tax may decrease caloric and added sugar intake in
preschoolers, it may not improve diet quality.32 Specif-
ically, unfavorable changes in fatty acid profile, total
protein, and vegetable and fruit intake were noted. These
inconsistencies reinforce the argument that the impact of
SSB taxes on children should be closely monitored and
evaluated.
Even without overwhelming evidence that SSB taxes
will reduce SSB consumption and obesity rates, SSB taxes
still may be a viable approach to funding public health
programs, including nutrition education, physical activity,
and improved access to healthy foods.13 However, di-
recting tax revenues toward broader public needs may
improve the likelihood of SSB tax enactment, as seen
in the passage of Philadelphia’s tax of 1.5 cents/oz on
sugar-sweetened and diet drinks.33 The tax proposal did
not issue a ‘‘nanny state’’ agreement; instead, it directed
SSB tax funds toward public programs such as universal
prekindergarten and park improvements.33 Moreover, it is
doubtful that SSB taxes are a magic bullet in address-
ing the growing concern for obesity. To have the greatest
impact, SSB taxes likely need to be accompanied by
nutrition education and an array of policies that would
require sugar warning labels on products and advertise-
ments, decrease SSB availability, and regulate health claims.
LOBBYING BY SODA COMPANIES, THE
HFCS INDUSTRY, AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Although sugar represents only 2% of the total value of
US crop production, 35% of all crop industries’ total
campaign donations and 40% of all crop industries’ total
lobbying expenditures apparently come from the sugar
industry.1 In light of recent attempts to tax SSBs, the bev-
erage industry created Americans Against Food Taxes.34
This group is funded by more than 400 companies in-
volved in food production and distribution, including
National Association of Convenience Stores, Corn Refiners
Association, American Beverage Association, Grocery
Manufacturers Association, National Supermarkets Asso-
ciation, Florida Chamber of Commerce, Georgia Agri-
business Council, National Association of Theater Owners,
and National Retail Federation, among others. From 2006
to 2008, the lobbying budget of Americans Against Food
Taxes was $1 million. However, their budget grew to $20
million in 2009.
The American Beverage Association and soda companies
have spent at least a combined $106 million on lobbying
and issue ads between 2009 and 2015.35 This figure is
TABLE 2 Descriptions of Various SSB Tax
Models
Type of SSB Tax How the Tax Works
Sales tax Calculated as a percentage
of the retail sales price and
paid by consumers at the
point of sale
Excise tax Imposed on producers and/or
sellers; can be passed onto
consumers in the retail shelf
price of a product
Volume-based excise tax Tax rate applied per ounce;
a sugar threshold may need
to be surpassed to apply
Calorie-based excise tax Tax rate applied per calorie
Nutrient-specific excise tax Tax rate proportionally
applied to percentage of
sugar content
Abbreviation: SSB, sugar-sweetened beverage.
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likely much higher, considering that campaign and lobby
expenses data are not available from ‘‘10 out of the 23
jurisdictions that have considered policies aimed at re-
ducing sugar-drink consumption.’’ A 2013 example of
food industry expenditure to prevent soft drink regulation
was their response to the efforts of New York Mayor
Michael Bloomberg to limit the size of SSBs to no more than
16 oz.36 Thebeverage industry spent $15.2million to combat
this effort, which was eventually ruled illegal. The judge in
the case called the law ‘‘arbitrary and capricious.’’35,36 At the
same time, the American Beverage Association adopted an
education approach while condemning taxes on SSBs.34
Their stance was that Americans cannot be taxed into better
healthVonly education can help Americans make better
food choices.
Likewise, public health advocates have also engaged in
lobbying to support SSB taxes. Philadelphians for a Fair
Future, a nonprofit organization funded mainly by bil-
lionaires Michael Bloomberg and John and Laura Arnold,
spent $2.1 million on ads, polls, and staff to support
Philadelphia’s soda tax, as compared with the $10.6 mil-
lion spent by the American Beverage Association to
oppose the tax. Interestingly, the soda industry branded
the tax as a ‘‘grocery tax,’’ thereby suggesting that the tax
applies to more than SSBs.37
SUMMARY
America has long been balancing the economic need to
maintain domestic sugar production, support domestic
agriculture, and promote the health of its citizens. Sugar
policies support our nation’s sugar and corn farmers.
However, without the sugar program, sugar in the United
States would be less expensive. Taxing SSBs, because they
are a very significant source of empty calories in most
Americans’ diets, is a public health strategy aimed at re-
ducing obesity. This tax could be volume, calorie, or nu-
trient based; however, a nutrient-specific tax is theoretically
the most effective at decreasing consumption of sugary
drinks due to its ability to produce the greatest decrease
in caloric intake. The revenue generated from such a tax
could be used to fund public health initiatives that would
encourage healthy eating patterns and physical activity. If
they really can reduce caloric intakes, sugar taxation ef-
forts might ultimately reduce rates of diabetes and obesity.
The paradox of sugar prices is that Americans have paid
higher prices for sugar to protect domestic production for
more than 80 years, and now, Americans are paying even
higher prices for sugar to promote public health. The ef-
fective use of sugar taxes should be considered based on
their merits in reducing sugar consumption and making
available a new source of funds to support nutrition
education, not on lobbying efforts by the food industry
or sugar and corn producers.
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